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Abstract
We investigate the dynamic relationship between advertising and product quality
under duopolistic competition. By using a simpli¯ed vertical product di®erentiation
model with voluntary advertising, we show that the ¯rm with larger market share
has a larger advertising share and that there is a positive relationship between the
di®erence in product quality and the number of customers in an industry.
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1 Introduction
Advertising is an important aspect of the behavior of ¯rms, as reported by Huang et
al. (2012). In an industry, even though ¯rms compete with one another, they voluntarily
advertise to persuade customers to buy their products over others (Friedman (1983); Martin
(1993)).1) This occurs because of the knowledge that there is a positive externality on
voluntary advertising; that is, advertising bene¯ts all other ¯rms within an industry that
produce the same industrial products. Advertising, therefore, can be interpreted as a public
good (Roberts and Samuelson (1988); Piga (1998)). As the number of customers increases,
all the ¯rm within an industry increase their pro¯ts.
Voluntary advertising is frequently used by emerging industries and those that produce
luxury goods. In emerging industries, competition over formats, such as that which oc-
curred between the Blu-ray and HD DVD manufacturers, is common. Firms that produce
products with a unique proprietary format use advertising to increase their market size. In
industries that produce luxury goods, such as cigarettes, jewels, and brand-name goods,
¯rms advertise in order to persuade new customers to buy their products.
Roberts and Samuelson (1988) and Piga (1998) investigate the relationship between
advertising and production quality by using the model of product di®erentiation within an
industry. Roberts and Samuelson (1988) empirically investigate the U.S. cigarette industry.
They focused on the tar content in cigarettes and divided the industry into low- and high-
tar markets; that is, high-tar cigarettes are produced by high-quality ¯rms and low-tar ones
are produced by low-quality ¯rms. They found that, although both high- and low-quality
¯rms advertised independently, advertising by high-quality ¯rms bene¯ts low-quality ones,
and vice versa, and that the ¯rms with the larger market share had the larger advertising
share. Piga (1998) used the Hotelling (1929) location model and obtained results showing
that market and advertising shares are positively correlated2). Furthermore, he showed
that the industry size increases with the di®erence in ¯rms' production e±ciency.3)
Although Piga (1998) provided a good explanation of the empirical results, a vertical
di®erentiation model would be more suitable than one for horizontal di®erentiation for the
analysis of emerging industries and those producing luxury goods. Therefore, adopting a
simpli¯ed vertical product di®erentiation model, we investigate the dynamic relationship
between advertising and production quality under duopolistic competition. The model
leads us to con¯rm that the results obtained by Piga (1998) are robust; that is, we show
that the ¯rm with the larger share has the largest advertising share and that there is a
positive relation between the di®erence in product quality4) and the number of customers
1) Another type of advertising is implemented within an industry. Within the industry, ¯rms produce
physically almost identical goods and advertise to increase their shares. There is a considerable amount of
literature dealing with this type of advertising. See Dockner et al. (2000) and Colombo and Lambertini
(2003).
2) They study the dynamic relationship between advertising and pricing under duopolistic competition.
Advertising has the main e®ect on the increase in the market size, and ¯rms di®er in production e±ciency.
3) In Piga (1998), the production e±ciency depends on the marginal costs.
4) This quality can be regarded as the e±ciency in Piga (1998).
in the industry. Furthermore, we identify some di®erent points in the results obtained
byPiga (1998). First, whether or not high-quality ¯rm obtains the larger market share
depends on the maximum value of marginal willingness to pay and not on the marginal
costs. Second, the increase in quality di®erence leads to an expansion of advertising by
both types of ¯rm. In Piga (1998), however, when the e±ciency di®erence increases, the
larger-share ¯rm increases its advertising but the lower-share ¯rm decreases it.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains the basic
setup. Section 3 is a derivation of the steady state and analysis of product quality di®erence;
that is, how it a®ects the total advertising volume, the ¯rm pro¯t, and the total number
of customers in the market is analyzed. Section 4 is the conclusion.
2 The Model
A high-quality ¯rm, H and a low-quality ¯rm, L exist in an economy. The high-quality
¯rm produces high-quality goods, and the low-quality ¯rm produces low-quality ones. The
technology level of each ¯rm is exogenously given by si for i 2 fL;Hg and satis¯es the
relation, sH > sL > 0.
Consumers are uniformly distributed along the line with density, N , of consumers and
have several preferences for goods, µ 2 [0; ¹µ]. This parameter µ represents each consumer's
marginal willingness to pay and ¹µ is the maximum value. According to preferences, each
consumer is assumed to purchase one unit of goods from either a high-quality ¯rm or a
low-quality ¯rm. We assume that the indirect utility function is u = µsi ¡ pi, where pi
is good i's price. Hence, there is a threshold which characterizes the consumer who is
indi®erent between buying the high-quality goods and buying the low-quality goods.
~µ =
pH ¡ pL
sH ¡ sL
Consumers who have the preferences, µ 2 (0; ~µ) buy the low-quality goods, and consumers
who have the preferences, µ 2 (~µ; ¹µ) buy the high-quality goods. Therefore, there is no
consumer who does not buy anything at all.
Using the indirect utility function, we can derive the demand functions,
NyL = N(~µ ¡ 0) = N
µ
pH ¡ pL
sH ¡ sL
¶
(¸ 0); (1)
NyH = N(¹µ ¡ ~µ) = N
µ
¹µ ¡ pH ¡ pL
sH ¡ sL
¶
(¸ 0); (2)
where yL and yH represent shares where consumers buy low-quality goods and high-quality
goods, respectively.
The sum of the discounted present value of the pro¯t for ¯rm i, Vi, is
Vi =
Z 1
0
¼i(t)e
¡½tdt =
Z 1
0
£
N(t)yi(t)(pi(t)¡ ci)¡ ¹Ai(t)2
¤
e¡½tdt; (3)
where ¼i(t) is ¯rm i's pro¯t, ci is the exogenous production cost, Ai(t) is the investment in
the advertisement, ¹Ai(t)
2 is the investment cost, ¹ is the exogenous positive parameter,
and ½ is discount rate. For simplicity, we assume that the production cost is a linear
function with respect to the quality, that is ci = si. In the present model, the control
variables are the consumption, ci(t) and the advertisement, Ai(t), and the state variable is
the number of consumers, N(t).
The state variable evolves according to the following state equation,
_N(t) = ®(AH(t) + AL(t))¡ ¸N(t); (4)
where ® > 0 is the exogenous advertising e±ciency parameter and the initial stock N(0)(>
0) is given. ¸ > 0 is the depreciation rate, which implies that, if ¯rms do not advertise,
consumers lose their interest in goods in the industry. This state equation is followed
from Piga (1998), which implies that advertising is cooperative behavior in the sense that
the advertising of a ¯rm bene¯ts not only itself but another ¯rm. In other words, the
advertising has public good characteristics.
It is noteworthy that the state equation and ¯rms' pro¯t functions are linear with
respect to the state variable. In addition, as discussed below, the control variables are
independent from the state variable, and open-loop strategies do not depend on the initial
state. This is called the linear state game, which has the property that the open-loop
equilibrium is Markov perfect.5) Therefore, in the analysis below, we use the Hamiltonian
function to solve this duopolistic game.
3 Duopoly Equilibrium
Although each ¯rm advertises cooperatively, it competes with each other with respect to
its product price. In what follows, we solve each ¯rm's problem, derive the steady-state
duopoly equilibrium, and then examine comparative statics.
3.1 The low-quality ¯rm's problem
The low-quality ¯rm's decision follows from maximizing (3) subject to (1) and (4), given
the initial stock N(0) and high-quality ¯rm's strategies. The current value Hamiltonian of
the low-quality ¯rm is as follows.
HL = N(t)
·
pH ¡ pL
sH ¡ sL ¡
pL
sL
¸
(pL(t)¡ sL)¡ ¹AL(t)2 + ÁL(t) [®(AH(t) + AL(t))¡ ¸N(t)] ;
5) See Dockner, et al. (2000), section 7.3.
where ÁL represents the co-state variable associated with (4). The ¯rst-order conditions
are the following:
pL(t) =
pH(t) + sL
2
; (5)
ÁL(t) =
2¹
®
AL(t); (6)
_ÁL(t) = (¸+ ½)ÁL(t)¡
·
pH ¡ pL
sH ¡ sL
¸
(pL(t)¡ sL); (7)
0 = lim
t!1
ÁL(t)N(t)e
¡½t: (8)
3.2 The high-quality ¯rm's problem
The high-quality ¯rm's decision follows from maximizing (3) subject to (2) and (4), given
the initial stock N(0) and low-quality ¯rm's strategies. The current value Hamiltonian of
the high-quality ¯rm is
HH = N(t)
·
¹µ ¡ pH ¡ pL
sH ¡ sL
¸
(pH(t)¡ sH)¡ ¹AH(t)2 + ÁH(t) [®(AH(t) + AL(t))¡ ¸N(t)] :
where ÁL represents the co-state variable associated with (4). The ¯rst-order conditions
are the following:
pH(t) =
¹µ(sH ¡ sL) + sH + pL(t)
2
; (9)
ÁH(t) =
2¹
®
AH(t); (10)
_ÁH(t) = (¸+ ½)ÁH(t)¡
·
¹µ ¡ pH ¡ pL
sH ¡ sL
¸
(pH(t)¡ sH); (11)
0 = lim
t!1
ÁH(t)N(t)e
¡½t: (12)
To analyze the steady state, we impose the following assumption.
Assumption 1. The initial co-state variables are assumed to be
ÁL(0) =
(¹µ + 1)2(sH ¡ sL)
9(¸+ ½)
; ÁH(0) =
(2¹µ ¡ 1)2(sH ¡ sL)
9(¸+ ½)
:
This assumption guarantees that the transversality conditions for both ¯rms hold.6)
6) See Appendix A.
3.3 Optimal Value and Steady-State Value
From (5) and (9), we obtain the equilibrium prices,
p¤H =
2¹µ(sH ¡ sL) + 2sH + sL
3
(13)
p¤L =
¹µ(sH ¡ sL) + sH + 2sL
3
(14)
These prices do not depend on time; i.e., in equilibrium these values are constant over time.
Furthermore, each ¯rm's price depends not only on its own technology but also on that of
the opponent.
From (7), (11), and Assumption 1, the co-state variables in equilibrium are constant,
Á¤L = ÁL(0) =
(¹µ + 1)2(sH ¡ sL)
9(¸+ ½)
; Á¤H = ÁH(0) =
(2¹µ ¡ 1)2(sH ¡ sL)
9(¸+ ½)
:
This immediately leads to equilibrium advertising,
A¤L =
®(¹µ + 1)2(sH ¡ sL)
18¹(¸+ ½)
; (15)
A¤H =
®(2¹µ ¡ 1)2(sH ¡ sL)
18¹(¸+ ½)
: (16)
Advertising by each ¯rm is constant over time. Therefore, it is clear that the dynamical
system is described by only (4).
The steady-state stock of the number of consumers is obtained by setting _N = 0:
N¤ =
®2(5¹µ2 ¡ 2¹µ + 2)(sH ¡ sL)
18¸¹(¸+ ½)
: (17)
It is easy to check that the term 5¹µ2 ¡ 2¹µ + 2 in the numerator is always positive.7) This
implies that the consumer density in the steady state is always positive.
Next, we consider the stability of the system by solving (4). Substituting (15) and (16)
into (4), we obtain
N(t) =
®2(5¹µ2 ¡ 2¹µ + 2)(sH ¡ sL)
18¸¹(¸+ ½)
+
·
N(0)¡ ®
2(5¹µ2 ¡ 2¹µ + 2)(sH ¡ sL)
18¸¹(¸+ ½)
¸
e¡¸t (18)
This implies that, for any initial stock N(0), N converges to the steady-state N¤ due to the
positivity of ¸. In addition, when the initial stock N(0) is smaller than the steady-state
value N¤, N is monotonically increasing until achieving the steady state value. On the
other hand, when the initial stock N(0) is larger than N¤, N is monotonically decreasing
until achieving the steady state value.
7) Translating the term 5¹µ2 ¡ 2¹µ + 2 into the standard form, we get 5 ¡¹µ ¡ 15¢2 + 95 > 0 for all ¹µ.
Finally, we compare the pro¯ts between both ¯rms. Both ¯rms' lifetime values are
VL =
N(0)(¹µ + 1)2(sH ¡ sL)
9(¸+ ½)
+
®2(¹µ + 1)2(3¹µ2 ¡ 2¹µ + 1)(sH ¡ sL)2
108½¹¸(¸+ ½)2
; (19)
VH =
N(0)(2¹µ ¡ 1)2(sH ¡ sL)
9(¸+ ½)
+
®2(2¹µ ¡ 1)2(2¹µ2 + 1)(sH ¡ sL)2
108½¹¸(¸+ ½)2
: (20)
For (19), the ¯rst term in the RHS is positive. Since the term 3¹µ2 ¡ 2¹µ + 1 is always
positive,8) the second term is also positive. (20) is always positive. Therefore, we obtain
the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If ¹µ < 2, the lifetime value and the advertising share of the low-quality
¯rm is larger than those of the high-quality ¯rm . If ¹µ > 2, the lifetime value and the
advertising share of the low-quality ¯rm is smaller than those of the high-quality ¯rm. If
¹µ = 2, both ¯rms have the same lifetime values and advertising shares.
Proof. See Appendix B.
This proposition illustrates that the high-quality ¯rm is not always dominant. In the
developed markets or countries, people have preferences for higher-quality goods; thus, the
high-quality ¯rm can obtain a larger market share and earn more pro¯t than the low-quality
¯rm. Conversely, in the less developed markets or countries people prefer less variety; thus,
the low-quality ¯rm can obtain a larger market share and earn more pro¯t.9)
3.4 Comparative Statics
We now examine how the optimal values change when each ¯rm's technology changes.
Firstly, the increases in the quality, si for i 2 fH;Lg yield
@A¤L
@sH
=
®(¹µ + 1)2
18¹(¸+ ½)
> 0;
@A¤H
@sH
=
®(2¹µ ¡ 1)2
18¹(¸+ ½)
> 0; (21)
@A¤L
@sL
= ¡ ®(
¹µ + 1)2
18¹(¸+ ½)
< 0;
@A¤H
@sL
= ¡®(2
¹µ ¡ 1)2
18¹(¸+ ½)
< 0: (22)
This result implies that a change in quality di®erence has the same e®ect on the behavior
of both the low-quality ¯rm and the high-quality ¯rm. In other words, the increase in sH
always leads to an expansion of advertising by both types of ¯rm. On the other hand, the
increase in sL always leads to a reduction in advertising by both types of ¯rm.
Di®erentiating (17) with respect to si for i 2 fL;Hg yields
@N¤
@sH
=
®2(5¹µ2 ¡ 2¹µ + 2)
18¸¹(¸+ ½)
> 0;
@N¤
@sL
= ¡®
2(5¹µ2 ¡ 2¹µ + 2)
18¸¹(¸+ ½)
< 0: (23)
8) In the same way, we can obtain the standard form, 9
¡¹µ ¡ 13¢2 + 2 > 0 for all ¹µ.
9) We can easily verify that y¤H R y¤L if and only if ¹µ R 2.
This implies that if the di®erence in ¯rms' technology becomes larger; i.e., if the technology
level of the high-quality ¯rm increases, both ¯rms invest in more advertisement and, as a
result, can get more consumers. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
t
N
N(0)0
N¤
N¤¤
t
N
N(0)
N¤
N¤¤
Figure 1: The e®ects of increase in sH
In such a situation, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The lifetime values of both ¯rms are increasing functions with respect to
the technology of the high-quality ¯rm and decreasing functions with respect to that of the
low-quality ¯rm.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The proposition implies that both types of ¯rm prefer larger di®erences of technology
between the high-quality ¯rm and the low-quality ¯rm. When the di®erence becomes
smaller, since the monopoly power of the industry becomes small, both ¯rms' incentives
to advertise disappear. As a result, the number of consumers decreases, and neither ¯rms
increases its earnings. Therefore, the low-quality ¯rm has no incentive to produce higher-
quality goods.
4 Conclusion
We investigated the dynamic relationship between advertising and production quality under
oligopolistic competition. Using a simpli¯ed version of the vertical product di®erentiation
model with voluntary advertising, we con¯rm that the results obtained by Piga (1998) are
robust; that is, we showed that the ¯rm with a larger market share has a larger advertising
share and that there is a positive relationship between the di®erence in product quality
and the number of customers. In addition, we found two di®erences from the results of
Piga (1998). First, the shares of high-quality and low-quality ¯rms are determined by the
maximum value of marginal willingness to pay and not the marginal costs. Second, a change
in quality di®erence has the same e®ect on the advertising behavior of both low-quality
and high-quality ¯rms.
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Appendix A. Transversality Conditions
Using (7), (11), (13), and (14), we solve di®erential equations for the co-state variables.
ÁL(t) =
xL
¸+ ½
+
·
ÁL(0)¡ xL
¸+ ½
¸
e(¸+½)t (24)
ÁH(t) =
xH
¸+ ½
+
·
ÁH(0)¡ xH
¸+ ½
¸
e(¸+½)t (25)
where
xL =
(¹µ + 1)2(sH ¡ sL)
9
; and xH =
(2¹µ ¡ 1)2(sH ¡ sL)
9
We substitute these equations into (4),
_N =
®2
2¹
µ
xL + xH
¸+ ½
+
·
ÁL(0) + ÁH(0)¡
µ
xL + xH
¸+ ½
¶¸
e(¸+½)t
¶
¡ ¸N(t):
Then, we solve this di®erential equation,
N(t) =
·
N(0)¡ xN
¸
¡ ÁN(0)¡ xN
2¸+ ½
¸
e¡¸t +
xN
¸
+
ÁN(0)¡ xN
2¸+ ½
e(¸+½)t: (26)
where
xN =
®2
2¹
µ
xL + xH
¸+ ½
¶
; and ÁN(0) =
®2
2¹
(ÁH(0) + ÁL(0)):
We now check that the transversality conditions hold. From (8),
lim
t!1
ÁL(t)N(t)e
¡½t (27)
= lim
t!1
Ã
M
xL
¸+ ½
e¡(¸+½)t +M
µ
ÁL(0)¡ xL
¸+ ½
¶
+
xLxN
¸(¸+ ½)
e¡½t
+
xN
¸
µ
ÁL(0)¡ xL
¸+ ½
¶
e¸t +
xL
¸+ ½
µ
ÁN(0)¡ xN
2¸+ ½
¶
e¸t
+
µ
ÁN(0)¡ xN
2¸+ ½
¶µ
ÁN(0)¡ xN
2¸+ ½
¶
e(2¸+½)t
!
where
M = N(0)¡ xN
¸
¡ ÁN(0)¡ xN
2¸+ ½
To hold the transversality condition requires that
ÁL(0) =
xL
¸+ ½
; and ÁH(0) =
xH
¸+ ½
: (28)
Condition (28) is also required to hold the transversality condition of the high-quality ¯rm.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 1
Subtracting (20) from (19) yields
VL ¡ VH = (2¡ ¹µ)
·
N(0)(sH ¡ sL)¹µ
3(¸+ ½)
+
®2(sH ¡ sL)¹µ(5¹µ2 ¡ 2¹µ + 2)
108½¹¸(¸+ ½)2
¸
; (29)
and subtracing (16) from (15) yields
A¤L ¡ A¤H =
®¹µ(sH ¡ sL)
6¹(¸+ ½)
(2¡ ¹µ): (30)
Since the terms in the square brackets in (29) and the coe±cient of (2 ¡ ¹µ) in (30) are
positive, the signs of (29) and (30) depend on the term (2 ¡ ¹µ). Therefore, if ¹µ Q 2,
VL R VH and A¤L R A¤H .
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 2
We can easily check the signs by di®erentiating both ¯rms' pro¯t functions with respect to
si for i 2 fL;Hg.
@VL
@sH
=
N(0)(¹µ + 1)2
9(¸+ ½)
+
®2(¹µ + 1)2(3¹µ2 ¡ 2¹µ + 1)(sH ¡ sL)
54½¹¸(¸+ ½)2
> 0;
@VL
@sL
= ¡
·
N(0)(¹µ + 1)2
9(¸+ ½)
+
®2(¹µ + 1)2(3¹µ2 ¡ 2¹µ + 1)(sH ¡ sL)
54½¹¸(¸+ ½)2
¸
< 0;
@VH
@sH
=
N(0)(2¹µ ¡ 1)2
9(¸+ ½)
+
®2(2¹µ ¡ 1)2(2¹µ2 + 1)(sH ¡ sL)
54½¹¸(¸+ ½)2
> 0;
@VH
@sL
= ¡
·
N(0)(2¹µ ¡ 1)2
9(¸+ ½)
+
®2(2¹µ ¡ 1)2(2¹µ2 + 1)(sH ¡ sL)
54½¹¸(¸+ ½)2
¸
< 0:
